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Imagineering the U.S. Public Debt: How Changing Perceptions of the 
Debt altered the Mechanics of Treasury Debt Management in the 
1860s and 1960s 
 
The term “imagineering” first gained currency in the 1960s when Walt Disney used it as 
a way to describe the design process for creating the animatronic displays at the new 
Disneyland in Anaheim, California.  It was the way of making real an imagined reality.1   
 
About the same time, the Department of the Treasury was changing the way it managed 
the public debt.  For almost two hundred years, it had conducted debt operations using 
bits of paper in the form of securities.  But, in the 1960s, the Treasury began following 
the Federal Reserve‟s movement to electronic book-keeping and securities; and by the 
end of the decade, the era of paper notes and bonds was quickly ebbing away.  Such 
dramatic change in the Treasury‟s debt management was a rare occurrence.  Nothing of 
the same magnitude had happened since the 1860s.  Then, in the heat and chaos of 
the Civil War, the Treasury had abandoned the age-old tradition of having private 
printers make U.S. Government securities and went into the printing business itself, 
creating the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. 
 
So, why did the Treasury make these momentous changes and what does debt 
management have in common with animatronics?  It appears that changes in Treasury 
debt management in the 1860s and 1960s stemmed from changes in perceptions of the 
nature of the U.S. public debt.  And, in adopting a new mechanics of debt management, 
the Treasury strove to make real what was widely imagined. 
 
THE BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING 
In the years before the Civil War, stretching back to colonial days, Government 
securities were printed only by private printers.  There were no official facilities for 
producing securities.  But, in the early years of the Civil War, all this changed.  The 
Treasury began printing its own securities, and by the end of 1864, had printed millions 
of securities and currency worth over $1.6 billion.2  In a little over three years, around 
100 years of tradition were overthrown with the United States Government establishing 
a monopoly on Government currency and security production.  In an age of laissez-
faire, private bank note companies were cast aside and the Treasury entered the 
printing business.  What happened?  Briefly, the old system of privately-based 
Government debt financing collapsed during the early years of the Civil War and was 
replaced with a publicly-based system in which the public debt was reconceived as a 
                                            
1
 This paper was produced while the author was historical consultant to the Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing, Washington, DC.  The views, conclusions, and opinions stated in this paper are those of the 
author and not necessarily those of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing.  The author also bears all 
responsibility for the accuracy of all dates, numbers, calculations, citations, names, and other salient 
facts.  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 33
rd
 Annual Meeting of the History of 
Economics Society in 2006 and the 32
nd
 Annual Meeting of the Social Science History Association in 
2007.  
2
 “Report to the Secretary of the Treasury from the First Division of the National Currency Bureau,” 55.   
Hereafter cited as NCB report. 
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source of profit to individual citizens.  The mechanics of this new system were 
embodied in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing.  To explain this we need to examine 
the mechanics of debt financing during the early Civil War. 
 
Around a month after the Union defeat at First Manassas or Bull Run, Secretary of the 
Treasury Salmon P. Chase did what Treasury Secretaries had done since Hamilton 
held the office, picked up his hat and coat and went to negotiate a loan from the big 
northeastern banks.3  In the middle of August 1861, after a week of cajoling and veiled 
threats, Chase got the bankers to agree to a “plan for assisting the United States 
government.”4  It was a $150 million loan (in three installments of $50 million in gold) 
given in exchange for the like amount in three-year Treasury notes paying 7.30% (also 
known as Seven-Thirties) that they could later sell to clients above par.5  Until the first 
$50 million in gold arrived in the Treasury, Chase planned to issue $50 million in 
Demand Notes, non-interest-bearing notes payable upon demand in gold at any 
Treasury office.  Issuing Treasury notes and Demand Notes sounds simple enough until 
one considers what was actually involved in producing and processing the millions of 
pieces of paper needed to fulfill these plans.   
 
In the comparatively sleepy days before the Civil War, the Treasury followed a time-
consuming procedure for issuing securities.   First, it contracted with one of the New 
York bank note companies to produce the 25,000 or so securities it needed for its 
average issue before the war of $10 million.6  Finished securities would begin arriving in 
Washington in around a month with the total printing job taking around six to eight 
weeks to complete.  The securities were printed anywhere from one to four per sheet; 
and upon reaching the Treasury, the sheets were bound in a book.  Then whenever a 
security was sold, a clerk in the Register‟s office would perform the proper record 
keeping and, taking a pair of scissors, cut the security out of the book.  The security 
would then pass to the Register for his signature.  Next, it went to the Treasurer‟s office.  
Here more record keeping would occur and the Treasurer would sign the security.  The 
duly signed security would then pass to the Secretary‟s office, which might record 
further information, and pass it along to the sealing room.  Here a clerk would emboss 
the Treasury seal on the security, marking its authenticity.  The security was then ready 
for issue. 
 
Chase‟s Seven-Thirties were issued by this method.  Though, with around 210,000 
securities to be issued, it was a bit of a strain on Treasury personnel.7  It helped that 
they were being sold en bloc, eliminating the need to record all that individual ownership 
information and that the authorizing legislation for the issue allowed the Treasury to skip 
                                            
3
 Sloan, 210; Kagin, 69, 74, 76. 
4
 Mitchell, 23. 
5
 Hammond, 73-87; Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, 1861, 9.  
Hereafter cited as Annual Report. 
6
 $10 million is the average issuance between 1845 and 1860.  Production figures are based on dollar 
amount of securities issued, using a linear regression of quarterly dollar amounts issued against 
production for the period of July 4, 1862 to October 1, 1864.  Dollar amounts issued were taken from 
Bayley, 180-3, and quarterly production figures from Noll, “The Production of Treasury Securities.”   
7
 Hessler, 215-9. 
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the step of applying the seal.  Luckily, the embossing of the Treasury seal was also 
eliminated in the case of the Demand Notes as an issue of $50 million was equivalent to 
around 4 million pieces of currency.8  
 
By the end of August 1861, sheets of Demand Notes were arriving in Washington from 
the New York printer.  The currency was delivered in uncut sheets containing four 
notes.  However, since no records of ownership had to be kept, these sheets were not 
bound in books.  At first, traditional methods of processing Treasury securities were 
followed with each note cut from a sheet by hand by clerks with scissors and signed by 
Treasury officials using pen and ink.  But as the enormity of the job ahead began to 
dawn upon the denizens of the Treasury, it was quickly decided that clerks could be 
authorized to sign notes in place of Treasury officials.  Soon there were as many as 70 
clerks signing notes with each expected to sign 3,000 notes a day and ever more 
women were hired to cut and trim the notes.9  Throughout the autumn and winter of 
1861, the clerks worked feverishly, waiting for the Union victory. 
 
By early 1862, it was clear to everyone that the war was going to prove longer and 
costlier than first anticipated.  With the Treasury facing bankruptcy and the bankers 
apparently unwilling to help,10 Congress authorized an additional, emergency issue of 
$10 million in Demand Notes and the issue of $150 million in a new fiat currency later 
known as the Greenback.11  How were the clerks in the Treasury supposed to 
accomplish all this work?  Already struggling to get the 4 million Demand Notes out the 
door, they now had an extra 400,000-500,000 more to deal with plus a towering 
mountain of Greenbacks—an added 21 million pieces of currency.12 
 
The legislation authorizing the Greenbacks recognized some of the problems.  The 
Treasury was allowed to have the signatures printed on the currency notes,13 
eliminating the need for a new army of clerks to do all that signing.  And, instead of 
embossing the Treasury seal on each note, Congress directed the Treasury to print it 
on.  Probably for the first time printing presses were brought inside the Treasury.  The 
mechanics of Treasury security issuance were changing. 
 
                                            
8
 In total $60,030,000 in Demand Notes were issued using 7,273,000 notes.  Assuming that the 
distribution of $5, $10, and $20 denominations remained constant over time, $50,000,000 worth of 
Demand Notes would require 3.6 million notes.  Total numbers from Vol. 1: Record of daily receipts of 
notes by denomination, Entry 291-X, RG 50, Records of the Treasurer of the United States, National 
Archives at College Park. 
9
 Scalia, “Demand Notes,” 5. 
10
 Richardson, 46-7; Redlich, 85-95. 
11
 Mitchell, 47; Bayley, 153, 156. 
12
 Greenbacks were issued in nine denominations, ranging from $1 to $1,000.  The number of 
Greenbacks needed to be produced was derived from cumulative processing figures for 1863 and 1864 
stated in dollar amounts.  The ratio of dollars to item was 7.7782.  Applying this ratio to $150 million 
resulted in 19,284,667 items.  Adding in $10 million in Demand Notes, gives a total of 20,496,834 items.  
Total numbers from Entry 291-V: Record of Legal Tender Notes Issued, 1862-1884, RG 50, Records of 
the Treasurer of the United States, National Archives at College Park. 
13
 Scalia, “‟I commenced the work,” 6. 
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Directing the change was Spencer Clark, at that time Acting Engineer in Charge of the 
Bureau of Construction.  He oversaw the printing of Treasury seals onto the 
Greenbacks.  Also, by this time, March 1862, Clark had already overcome the currency 
processing bottleneck of the cutting of notes from their sheets.  He mechanized the 
process with a hand-powered machine that cut and separated the Demand Notes.  And, 
in August he began development of a steam-powered machine for processing the 
Greenbacks.  This was successfully running a month later.14  So, by the end of 1862, 
the Treasury had mechanized the processing of printed sheets of securities.  All that 
remained to create a full-fledged Treasury-run bank note company (a Bureau of 
Engraving and Printing) was the in-house printing of securities.  This step came a few 
months later when problems arose with the Five-Twenty bonds.15 
 
The Greenbacks were in part intended to be a stopgap measure to hold the Treasury 
over until the newly authorized Treasury bonds, the Five-Twenties, could begin 
generating revenue.  To make up a massive shortfall in needed borrowing during fiscal 
year 1863, the Treasury planned to sell $500 million in Five-Twenty bonds.  Sales were 
initially flat as banks refused to deal in the bonds.  As Greenbacks were exchangeable 
for the bonds at the pleasure of the holder, the price of new Five-Twenties was 
effectively set at par, eliminating any chance of large-scale speculative purchases.16  
Sales picked up after October 1862 when Chase employed financier Jay Cooke as an 
agent for the Treasury.17  Using direct sales techniques and heavy advertising of the 
profitability of owning bonds, Cooke expected to sell at least a million dollars‟ worth of 
bonds a day by bypassing the banks and going straight to the general public.18  And, in 
the spring of 1863, sales of Five-Twenties finally began to accelerate.  Between the end 
of March and the end of June, quarterly sales skyrocketed from $7.2 million to $156.5 
million.19  The consequence was that there would be a major increase in the number of 
bonds that needed to be issued. 
 
Unlike currency, there were no major difficulties in processing the sheets of securities 
that came in from New York.  The Five-Twenties were almost all printed singly (one to a 
sheet) and did not need a seal applied.  All that was needed was for a clerk to perform 
some minimal bookkeeping and pass it on to the Register‟s office for an official 
signature; thousands could be processed in a day.  Basically, the bonds could be 
processed as fast as they were sold.  The problem in the issuance of the Five-Twenties 
was production—getting enough securities printed to meet sales. 
 
From the start, the printing of Five-Twenties lagged well behind demand.  Aiming to sell 
an unprecedented number of securities, the Treasury contracted with the two largest 
bank note companies in the country—the American Bank Note Company and the 
National Bank Note Company—to produce the needed 1.25 million Five-Twenty 
                                            
14
 Ibid., 8-11. 
15
 So called because the bonds were redeemable by the Government in five years and reached maturity 
in twenty.  They paid 6% interest. 
16
 Dewey, 2: 307. 
17
 Salmon Chase to Jay Cooke, 23 October 1862, Niven, 299-300; Larson, 118. 
18
 Larson, 120. 
19
 Bayley, 156. 
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bonds.20  To meet these levels of production the bank note companies would need to 
dedicate around 17 to 26 pressmen working full out, 8 to 12 hours a day, 6 days a week 
to the printing of Five-Twenties.21  The bank note companies were unwilling or unable to 
do this; and within weeks after the start of printing, Secretary Chase was reduced to 
begging and threatening the companies for greater production.22  Matters only got 
worse as Cooke worked to increase sales. 
 
The Government, and thereby Cooke, promised delivery of bonds within four days of 
purchase; and by the winter of 1862, it was taking the Treasury around 30 days to 
deliver the purchased bond to the buyer. 23  As the Treasury‟s representatives, Cooke 
and his agents took the brunt of the abuse from angry investors who demanded their 
money back, leaving Cooke with unsold bonds.  In turn, Cooke brought pressure to bear 
on Chase through his brother Henry, a confidant of Chase.  In March 1863, Henry 
Cooke reported to his brother, “I have done all I could, and so has…Chase, to hurry up 
the printing and forwarding of the bonds….I have shown him how the delay in deliveries 
checks sales as shown by the falling off in to-day‟s orders.”24 
 
By April sales of Five-Twenties were reaching $2.5 million a day.25  Cooke kept up the 
pressure on Chase to increase the speed of bond deliveries.  At one point during the 
month, Cooke had $8 million in bond orders awaiting delivery by the Treasury.   The 
growing backlog endangered Government credit and the success of the loan.26  Cooke‟s 
agents working on commission were dismayed at the continuing delays.  He reported 
that at a May 28 meeting with his New York agents, “all the agents [are] disposed to 
back out & quit the business—the delay of Bonds is ruinous & they say it is getting to be 
intolerable.  It takes all their time to manufacture excuses.”27  
 
With the big two bank note companies unable to meet current demands, Chase sought 
to involve more printers in production of the bonds.  But to do this, Chase needed the 
engraved plates used in printing the securities.  And since, technically, the plates used 
to print Government securities were the property of the Government; Chase sought to 
claim possession of them.  Both the American Bank Note and National Bank Note 
companies refused to give up the plates, calling Chase‟s proposal surprising, radical, 
and downright underhanded.28  Possession of the plates, the bank note companies 
                                            
20
 This figure was based on Clark‟s estimate of 250,000 securities per $100 million Five-Twenties.  
Spencer Clark to Henry Keeney, 12 June 1863.  Entry 5: Press Copies of Official and Miscellaneous 
Letters Sent, vol. 2, Records of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. 
21
 Noll, “The Beginning of Treasury Security Production,” 6n13, 8n15. 
22
 Tracy Edson to Salmon Chase, 16 April 1862.  Folder 1861-1862, Box 2: American Bank Note, Entry 
542: Correspondence with bank note companies, Records of the Bureau of the Public Debt.  Also see 
Tracy Edson to Salmon Chase, 12 August 1862, idem. 
23
 Henry Cooke to Jay Cooke, Oberholtzer, 1: 229. 
24
 Henry Cooke to Jay Cooke, Ibid., 1: 230. 
25
 Larson, 144. 
26
 Oberholtzer, 1: 231; Larson, 144. 
27
 Jay Cooke to Henry Cooke, Ibid., and Oberholtzer, 1: 232. 
28
 NCB report, 29-31; Fitch Shepard to Salmon Chase, 23 May 1863, Folder 1863-1864, Box 3: National 
Bank Note, Entry 542: Correspondence with bank note companies, Records of the Bureau of the Public 
Debt.   
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argued, ensured future business and this prospective profit was factored in to the cost 
of the printing run.29  Given this rebuff, Chase tried the alternative of enlarging the 
cooperation between American and National by including the newly formed Continental 
Bank Note Company.  However, the older companies refused to promote the business 
of this newcomer, wanting the status quo to be maintained.   
 
Trying to conduct business as usual on the bank note companies‟ terms had failed, and 
it was threatening to wreck the Treasury‟s plan for financing the war.  Desperate, 
Secretary Chase turned to Clark to take over the printing of the Five-Twenties inside the 
Treasury and to acquire all new plates from private engravers.  It was not until the 
middle of July 1863 that the plates were ready and Clark began to produce finished 
Five-Twenty bonds.  Using over 40 printers and producing more than 2,500 bonds a 
day,30 it took Clark until February 1864 to overcome the massive backlog in unfilled 
orders created by the bank note companies.31  The Treasury was now printing and 
processing its own securities and currency (Fractional Currency at this point), and the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing in everything but name was established. 
 
In effect, the creation of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing was a response to 
problems in the mechanics of Treasury security and currency issuance caused by the 
demands of war financing.  But why did the BEP endure?  It was a creation of wartime; 
and history is full of examples of institutions that arise because of the needs of war.  
Yet, once the war ends, such wartime creations tend to disappear as their raison d’etre 
is eliminated.  But why did not the Bureau of Engraving and Printing disappear with the 
end of the Civil War?  One could argue that the reason was the continued need for the 
large-scale production of securities: after the Civil War, there were more securities 
issued and these needed printing.  In fact, however, there is a steady decline in security 
issues after June 1866.32  And, it is not until the late 1870s that the Bureau of Engraving 
and Printing becomes seriously involved in currency printing.33  So, the production 
argument does not hold.  Well, what about currency processing?  With the end of 1865 
that too begins to decline until 1870.34  If we talk just in terms of large-scale production, 
the future looked pretty dim for the Bureau of Engraving and Printing at the end of the 
war.  The Government could have easily gone back to the private printing of 
Government securities and currency.  What then was the cause of the BEP‟s continued 
existence?  Looking back, we see a significant shift in attitudes toward Government 
deficit financing and the debt it created, one with which the Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing was intricately linked. 
 
                                            
29
 Report of the Joint Select Committee on Retrenchment, 186, 207. 
30
 Spencer Clark to Salmon Chase, 28 November 1863, Entry 5: Press Copies of Official and 
Miscellaneous Letters Sent, vol. 2, Records of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. 
31
 Spencer Clark to Salmon Chase, 4 February 1864, Folder 1, Box 1, Entry 602: Correspondence 
relating to the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Records of the Bureau of the Public Debt; Spencer Clark 
to Salmon Chase, 15 February 1864, idem. 
32
 Noll, "The United States Public Debt, 1861 to 1975."  See figure 9. 
33
 Historical Resource Center, 11. 
34
 The decline in processing is evident from a quick glance at the total money in circulation.  Annual 
Report, 1928, 554-55. 
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This shift is from the prewar system of “private” Government debt financing to a system 
of “public” Government debt financing.  Under the old system, contracting the 
Government‟s debt was predominantly a private matter between the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the large banks of the northeast.  Men would meet together in closed 
rooms and hammer out deals between the Government and interested businessmen.  It 
was a world of big dollar figures and the movement of gold in guarded wagons.  And, 
the securities issued to banks as security or for resale were privately printed.  After 
1863, Federal financing was a matter for the public.  Poorly paraphrasing Lincoln, a 
government by the people printed securities for sale to the people.  Government loans 
were marketed directly to average citizens who had Government currency in their 
pockets.  And, it was only proper that the securities be produced by a public printer. 
 
Why did the shift from private to public occur?  It appears to be a combination of factors.  
One was an inability or unwillingness of banks to mobilize the wealth of the country.  
Along with this failure of private financial institutions was that of the private printers and 
other companies that had practiced wartime price gauging.  The bank note companies 
refused to risk losing their monopoly and high profits even in the face of a collapse of 
Union finances.  There was also a growth of popular distrust and Republican dislike of 
banks.  The result of all this was the democratization or even Republicanization of 
Government borrowing.35  From this time forward, the exploitation of the public debt for 
private profit was demonized while the exploitation of the public debt for the profit of “the 
people” was heralded as a celebration of patriotism, optimism, democracy, and thrift—
basically all that was good in America.  In this brave new world, bankers took a back 
seat when securities were issued and private, profit-driven bank note companies had no 
place. 
 
So, the rise of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing points to a time of transition, 
occurring between the years 1861 and 1863.  At this time the system of Government 
borrowing shifted to a new foundation, from private to public, one in which it was the 
Government‟s task to make sure “the people” profited from Government debt—not 
bankers or bank note companies.  And, while reality may not wholly coincide with this 
ideal,36 Government borrowing still rests upon this foundation.  Thus we still have public 
offerings of Government securities and a Bureau of Engraving and Printing.   
 
BOOK-ENTRY PROCEDURE 
Nothing makes more sense nowadays than to conduct debt management operations 
electronically through book-entry procedures.  But, is it necessary?  Paper securities 
and physical transfers worked well for hundreds of years.  The shift from paper to 
electronic securities was a difficult and expensive process.  What drove the Treasury to 
make this change in the 1960s was not expectant cost savings but the Federal 
Reserve‟s need for speed in transactions.  This change in the mechanics of the 
Treasury debt management stemmed from a new conception of the public debt as a 
public good rather than a necessary evil. 
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 Richardson, chapts. 2-3; Lawson, chapt. 2. 
36
 Certainly, by the 1890s, the Government was again doing behind-the-scenes deals with the big New 
York banks.  See Noyes, 573-602. 
 8 
 
Here again we must examine the mechanics of Treasury debt management to explain 
what happened.  By the 1950s, Treasury procedures for issuing securities were 
certainly more efficient and faster than during the Civil War.  Yet, the Bureau of the 
Public Debt, using over 40 seal presses, was still embossing every security, except 
Savings Bonds, with the Treasury seal.37  And, instead of a signature, each security 
bore the personal initials of a recording Treasury or Federal Reserve Bank clerk.  This 
finally changed in August 1952, when the Treasury ended these practices.38  While the 
bookkeeping costs of issuance may have been minimized, there were still the costs of 
printing and redeeming securities. 
 
The Treasury securities issued in the early 1950s were mostly marketable securities 
with coupons attached.  The owner of the security received his semiannual interest 
payments on his investment by turning in a coupon to the Treasury.  The bearer of the 
security would detach the appropriate coupon and present it to the Treasury for 
payment through the banking system.  The holder of the security would turn the coupon 
in to his bank which would then send it on to the regional Federal Reserve bank.  Acting 
as the Treasury‟s fiscal agent, the Federal Reserve bank would issue a payment, 
physically cancel the coupon, and send on the coupon to the Treasury‟s transfer agent, 
the Bureau of the Public Debt.  This bureau then recorded the payment and destroyed 
the coupon.  The process would be completed for each of the coupons of each 
individual security.  Pretty much the same procedure was followed when the security 
matured and the body of the note or bond was sent in to claim payment of the principal.   
 
Investors buying millions of dollars in securities or a custodial bank holding billions of 
dollars in bonds or notes for their customers also had a lot of work to do when they 
wanted to cash in coupons every year.  As interest was paid semiannually, every year 
two coupons had to be detached from every individual security and turned in for 
payment.  If an investor had $500 million in Treasury notes, and hopefully held the sum 
in $1 million denomination securities, he would have to detach and turn in 1,000 
coupons a year.  Custodial banks handling larger sums and many smaller 
denominations had an even worse time.39  People had to be employed to cut, count, 
track, file, transport, and guard the coupons.  Vault space was needed to store all these 
securities.  And, between 1952 and 1955, the number of securities, especially notes, 
and coupons involved was to expand dramatically.  The resulting increase in costs was 
burdensome. 
 
An easy way to reduce the administrative costs involved would be to add a few zeros 
onto the existing denominations of the most popular securities, and this is what was 
done in the case of Treasury notes and certificates of indebtedness.  In the mid-1950s, 
the maximum denomination of these securities was raised from $1 million to $500 
                                            
37
 Robert L. Skinner to A.E. Weatherbee, 13 December 1966.  Folder: History of the Seal, U.S.T.D., New 
Seal of 1968, Box 24: Records of the Office of the Chief Clerk, Entry 679J: History of the Seal of the U.S. 
Treasury Department, 1778-1968, Records of the Department of the Treasury. 
38
 PD Bulletin No. 17, 29 August 1952, Public Debt Central Files, Series OA. 
39 Garbade, “G-20 Case Study,” 33. 
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million.  This cut down the amount of work involved in large issues of Treasury notes 
and certificates for everyone.  The $500 million investor now had only two coupons to 
worry about, as did the Bureau of the Public Debt.  And, the Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing only had to print one $500 million security instead of 500 $1 million securities.  
So, very-high-denomination notes and certificates were really money saving devices. 
 
Whatever the cost saving, it was not enough.  While very-high denominations saved on 
the costs of handling coupons and printing securities, they could not eliminate these 
costs or the costs of safe-keeping and transferring bearer securities.  And, transfer 
costs were rising. The transfer of a security even between two New York City banks 
was no easy or inexpensive matter.  It involved clerks, messengers, counters, and 
hours of work: 
 
The process started when a seller ordered its custodial bank to deliver securities 
from the seller‟s account (literally taking engraved certificates out of a file), 
verified the count, and packaged securities for delivery.  A messenger, possibly 
armed but usually not…, carried the securities to the buyer‟s bank, handed them 
over at a delivery window, and received a receipt and possibly a check for 
payment….The buyer‟s bank counted the securities, verified the count, and 
finally added the securities to the buyer‟s account (literally placing certificates in a 
file assigned to the buyer).40 
 
All this movement of paper certificates and their filing and refiling, increased the 
chances of them being lost or stolen.  And, the costs of handling bearer securities were 
rising as the number of bearer securities rose.41  The losses from theft were also rising.  
While the losses of Treasury securities due to theft amounted to less than $4 million in 
1966, $6 million in 1967, and $6.5 million in 1968, they skyrocketed to over $30 million 
in 1969.42  By late 1970, insurance companies were refusing to cover holders of 
Treasury securities against loss, threatening the functioning of the Government 
securities market. 
 
These transfer problems were overcome by the Federal Reserve‟s development of 
book-entry procedures, replacing paper securities with virtual, electronic ones.  Since 
the early 1960s, the Fed was investigating whether the securities held by member 
banks and Federal Reserve banks could be held in book-entry form.43  In 1968, a 
system was introduced allowing Federal Reserve banks to hold book-entry securities; 
and, in January 1970, all bearer securities held in the Federal Reserve‟s System Open 
Market Account became book-entry securities.44  With this development, 40% of all 
outstanding marketable debt was in book-entry form.  It was at this point that the 
Treasury stopped offering very-high-denomination Treasury notes and certificates of 
                                            
40
 Ibid., 35. 
41 Hillery and Thompson, 255. 
42 Testimony of John Carlock, 153, Public Debt Central Files, OA-155. 
43
 Garbade, “G-20 Case Study,” 44-45. 
44
 Ibid., 48-9. 
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indebtedness.  They were no longer necessary.  Over the next 30 years, all paper 
securities would be phased out. 
 
Yet, in the 1960s, the transition from paper to computer screen was not a foregone 
conclusion.  Other methods could have been found to control costs and help the market 
function smoothly: $1 billion securities, Government insurance of bearer securities, 
elimination of coupons or just annual interest payments, securities in the form of punch 
cards, etc.  And, automated bookkeeping does not infer the elimination of definitive 
securities.  Both existed side-by-side for many years at the Bureau of the Public Debt, at 
least since World War II.  Why make such a dramatic change from traditional, paper 
securities to electronic, virtual securities, overturning 200 years of financial experience 
and legal precedent?45  The argument made since the late 1960s was that book-entry 
was introduced because it was a cost saving innovation—was it? 
 
Book-entry was promoted and developed by the Federal Reserve banks.  From mid-
1963, the banks had studied how to apply electronic methods to definitive transferable 
Treasury securities.46  In terms of costs, the Bureau of the Public Debt did not foresee 
great savings with the advent of book-entry, only complications.  Instead of one form of 
security, it now had to deal with two: definitive and electronic.  Some investors would 
want one form, some another, and still other investors would want to change from one 
to another and maybe back again.47  New methods and procedures would have to be 
developed and new computers bought. Whatever savings there were in handling costs 
would be offset by higher accounting costs.48  No doubt the Federal Reserve banks 
would face much the same cost/benefit tradeoff.  True, fewer securities would need to 
be printed.  But, for the Bureau of Engraving and Printing whose raison d’etre was the 
printing of securities, was this a good thing?  In any case, it stayed in the business of 
printing definitive securities until 1986, almost 20 years after the introduction of book-
entry.  So, if cost savings were problematic and would not manifest themselves until 
well into the future,49 why would the Fed argue for the change as early as 1963? 
 
It was not because there was anything seriously wrong with the Treasury‟s existing 
system of handling its securities.  In the early 1960s, the Treasury was happy with the 
established way of dealing with Treasury securities, the very-high-denomination 
securities had helped keep costs down and the growth in outstanding marketable debt 
was leveling off.  (The massive expansion in marketable securities—primarily Treasury 
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notes and bills—with the accompanying explosion in costs and insurance difficulties 
would not start until 1967/1968.)  There were no impending crises, and the public debt‟s 
growth was almost stagnant.  The Treasury‟s system of debt management as revamped 
in the 1950s with all its paper securities ran efficiently and faced no foreseeable 
challenges.  So, the cause for the drive for book-entry must lie within the Fed itself—
something changed for the Fed in the early 1960s. 
 
Since the 1951 accord with the Treasury, wherein it had declared its independence from 
Treasury control, the Fed sought to avoid entanglements with the Treasury‟s public debt 
management.50  In part, its “bills only” policy, begun in 1953, was an attempt to maintain 
its freedom from Treasury influence by limiting as far as possible its connection with the 
public debt when conducting monetary policy.51  The Fed argued that, traditionally, 
central banks limited themselves to self-liquidating commercial paper and that Treasury 
bills were a necessary substitute for these ideal securities.52  Holding true to this belief, 
the Federal Reserve purchased couponed securities only twice between 1953 and 
1961.53  The Fed‟s concern was monetary stability, not the structure of interest rates in 
the secondary bond market.54 
 
This all changed in the early 1960s.  The period 1961 to 1963 saw some significant 
changes for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and its System Open Market 
Account.  In 1961, the FOMC abandoned its “bills only” policy, repeatedly entering the 
market for Treasury notes and bonds to participate in the Treasury‟s “Operation Twist,” 
which was an attempt to change the yield curve by manipulating the markets in public 
debt securities.55  As part of this operation, between 1961 and 1963, the System Open 
Market Account grew at an annual average rate of 7.5%, up from the 2.8% rate of the 
previous 10 years.56  The Fed was trying to adjust a balance of payments problem while 
restoring high employment following a recession occurring early in the Kennedy 
administration.  In effect, the Fed abandoned a policy and approach to the Treasury and 
the public debt that was almost a decade old.57  It now had a large stake in the public 
debt and how it was managed.58  More than ever, the management of the public debt 
became tied to the management of the money supply and economic policy.  And, the 
Fed found that the Treasury‟s traditional paper-based methods just were not adequate 
anymore.  In this new frontier, sitting on top of securities and processing coupon 
payments were not the most important functions, instead buying and selling—
transferring—securities were of the greatest importance.   
 
But, moving bits of paper around by hand was a slow, clumsy way of conducting 
transfers.  It was also a risky way of doing business.  In the middle of 1962, just when 
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the Fed was trying to get a handle on its new role in debt management, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco lost $7.5 million in bearer Treasury securities while the 
Reserve Bank of Richmond lost $100,000.59  This was the event that triggered the 
search for a quicker and, most of all, safer way to buy and sell securities.60  That search 
ended with the idea of book-entry.  Yet, the pursuit of book-entry in the early 1960s 
points towards a deeper change, the cause of the Fed‟s change in direction, its 
abandonment of a “bills only” policy.  The Fed‟s actions mark a change in perception of 
the public debt by the Government and society in general; they mark a passing of 
traditional ways of thinking about the debt.   
 
Before, during, and for some time after World War II, the debt was usually viewed as a 
transient evil.61  It was something that needed to be reduced, to have an end.  Paying 
down the debt was long a political imperative.  Using traditional systems to manage the 
debt was fine as it was always considered to be on its way out, always being reduced, 
resulting in ever less work.  The theoretical aim of the traditional debt management 
system was to put itself out of business.  But during the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
Keynesianism or the “New Economics” came to dominate thinking in Government 
finance and the public debt.62  In the 1960s, increased domestic spending, expansive 
monetary policy, and tax cuts, especially the heralded tax cut of 1964, were pursued not 
only to improve society but also to move the economy toward full employment. Deficits, 
Treasury debt issues, and, therefore, the public debt were now central to economic 
success.  The public debt was no longer a transient evil to be managed out of existence 
by the Treasury but a permanent benevolence to be nurtured for the public good to a 
large degree by the central bank. 
 
In the end, the use of electronic book-entry in public debt management was the 
manifestation of a sharp change in attitudes towards the public debt.  A change in the 
way of viewing the debt that burgeons in the Kennedy administration leads the Federal 
Reserve to become more closely involved in public debt management.  It finds 
traditional methods, conducted by the Treasury and epitomized by very-high-
denomination Treasury securities, to be inadequate for the new world of a permanent 
public debt and begins to develop electronic, book-entry procedures.  Paperless debt 
management replaces the traditional one as the size of the marketable debt rapidly 
expands and an insurance crisis appears.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In the 1860s and 1960s dramatic changes occurred in the mechanics of Treasury debt 
management.  In both instances the changes were not foregone conclusions.  After the 
Civil War, the Treasury did not need its own printing establishment anymore, but it kept 
the Bureau of Engraving and Printing.  And, in the 1960s, the Treasury did not have to 
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adopt the Fed‟s book-entry procedures to make debt management more efficient, yet it 
took this radical and expensive step anyway. 
 
The decisions only make sense when we consider changes in popular perceptions of 
the public debt.  In the 1860s, the public debt was recast in the popular mind as a 
source of profit for the average American investor.  It was no longer a matter of 
negotiations between Treasury officials and bankers but a public institution free of 
private influence.  Such a system logically called for a public printer, the Bureau of 
Engraving and Printing. 
 
A hundred years later, in the 1960s, the public debt ceased to be viewed as a transitory 
evil and came to be seen as a permanent good.  It was something that had to be 
managed to promote employment and economic growth.  Now, it was not enough to sit 
on securities and collect the interest.  Instead, securities had to be constantly bought 
and sold by the Federal Reserve.  This called for the speed and security only 
achievable through electronic book-entry. 
 
In the end, these changes in the mechanics of public debt management show us that 
they were not the result of the inevitable march of time but the shaping of ideas into 
reality. 
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